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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Th is study of the principle of consistent interpretation , more commonly 
referred to as the  Marleasing principle in UK law, 1 demonstrates the striking 
degree to which this method of statutory interpretation has been embedded in 
the practice of the UK national courts. Originating in the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), and based on the principle of 
loyal co-operation set out in Art. 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
the principle of consistent interpretation consists of a duty incumbent on all 
public authorities including national courts to interpret national law  “ as far as is 
possible to do so ” in conformity with European Union (EU) law. 2 Th e principle 
of consistent interpretation plays a fundamental role in securing the eff ective 
enforcement of individual rights derived from EU law before a national court. 3 
Th is study reveals that the principle has been invoked in a wide range of policy 
areas including tax, employment, intellectual property, data protection, and 
health and safety in the UK. More recently, the application of this method of 
statutory interpretation has been consciously  “ assimilated ” by the judiciary 
with the application of s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) despite their 
separate theoretical and schematic underpinnings. 4 
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United Kingdom
 5  Th is analysis is qualitative in nature and broadly responds to the questionnaire distributed 
by the primary investigator. A quantitative study would have been too onerous within the 
timeframe of the study. When  “ Marleasing ” is used as a search term (since the UK courts 
commonly use the term  “ Marleasing principle ” and deem this judgment to be the leading 
ECJ case on the doctrine) in the Westlaw database, as of January 2017, it reveals just over 600 
results. 
 6  For some examples, see  Lord  Mance ,  “ Th e interface between national and European law ” 
( 2013 )  38 ( 4 )  European Law Review  437 – 56 ;  W.  Twining and  D.  Miers ,  How to Do Th ings 
with Rules ( 5th ed., Butterworths ,  2010 ),  pp. 321 – 25 . For some analysis of earlier UK court 
decisions, see  A.  Arnull ,  “ Th e Law Lords and the European Union :  Swimming with the 
incoming tide ” ( 2010 )  35 ( 1 )  European Law Review  57 – 87 ; Drake (n. 3);  P.  Craig ,  “ Directives : 
 Direct eff ect, indirect eff ect and the construction of national legislation ” ( 1997 )  22 ( 6 ) 
 European Law Review  519 – 38 . 
 7  Th is is in marked contrast to the amount of ink spilt by public law scholars on the operation 
of s.3 (and s.4) HRA. 
 8  For more discussion of the academic debate amongst UK constitutional lawyers, see for 
example,  P.  Craig ,  “ Britain in the European Union ” in  J. Jowell,  D. Oliver ,  C. O ’ Cinneide (eds.), 
 Th e Changing Constitution ( 8th ed., Oxford University Press ,  2015 ),  pp. 114 – 24 ;  P.  Craig , 
 “ Parliamentary sovereignty of the United Kingdom parliament aft er Factortame ” ( 1991 )  11 
 Year Book of European Law  221 . 
 9  A.  Dicey ,  An Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution ( 10th ed .,  Palgrave Macmillan , 
 1967 ) . 
 10  H.W.R.  Wade ,  “ Th e basis of legal sovereignty ” [ 1955 ]  Cambridge Law Journal  172 . 
 11  A process of devolution to local government is underway in England. 
 Th is chapter makes an important contribution to the literature in three 
respects. First, it explores the conceptual basis and scope of application of the 
principle of consistent interpretation by the UK courts in a systematic manner. 5 
Th ere has been very limited exploration of its application before UK courts by 
either EU or public law scholars in more recent years, 6 and a notable absence 
of detailed discussion of its symbiotic relationship with s. 3 HRA. 7 Th e chapter 
identifi es three diff erent phases in the approach of the UK judiciary, and 
considers (briefl y) the implications of the UK ’ s withdrawal from the EU, and 
predicts the emergence of a fourth phase. It is argued that the three phases in 
the evolution of the application of the principle of consistent interpretation by 
the UK courts refl ect the changing perception of parliamentary sovereignty 
in the UK by the judiciary. Indeed, it is the tension between the traditional 
and  “ New View ” of parliamentary sovereignty and its relationship with the 
supremacy of EU law which is the common thread in these three periods. 8 
Th e traditional view, embodied in the works of Dicey 9 and Wade , 10 advocates 
that Parliament is the supreme law-maker and cannot bind its successors. 
Proponents of the  “ New View ” accept that Parliament is no longer the sole law-
maker, and that it may be bound by international Treaty obligations (including 
those set out in the EU Treaties and European Convention on Human Rights), 
and that some law-making powers have been devolved to Scotland , Northern 
Ireland and Wales . 11 
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 12  Lord Mance (n. 6), 450. 
 13  See the impact of counsel ’ s summary of the scope of the principle in  Vodafone 2 v. Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners [ 2009 ]  EWCA Civ 446 , at paras. 37 and 38. 
 Second, the chapter considers the more problematic application of the 
principle in two policy areas which are regulated to some degree by EU directives, 
namely motor insurance liability and annual leave . Th ird, the chapter allows for 
comparison with the application of the principle by the judiciary of the other 
Member States of the EU and EEA discussed in this volume. Over the past 
40 years, there has been a gradual acceptance by the UK judiciary of its 
interpretative obligation under EU law. Th is has culminated in an approach 
which is more far-reaching than any of the other Member States discussed 
in this volume. Lord Mance has described the UK courts as being,  “ … more 
catholic than the Pope in their understanding of this interpretative duty ” . 12 Th is 
has been accompanied by the increasing knowledge and expertise of lawyers 
who have recognised that the principle of consistent interpretation can be a 
formidable weapon when seeking to assert EU rights on behalf of an applicant 
against the mightier state or an employer. It is noteworthy that the arguments 
of legal counsel have had a signifi cant infl uence on the development of the 
jurisprudence. 13 
 Th is contribution will fi rst, and very briefl y, set out the UK ’ s position 
in (with) the EU in the rest of this section before exploring the nature of its 
constitutional  settlement including the relationship between UK law and 
EU law (section 2). Th e contribution then sets out the three diff erent phases in 
the application of the principle of consistent interpretation by the UK judiciary 
(section 3). Th is provides the foundation for a more detailed exploration of 
how the UK courts have determined the scope of their duty and applied the 
principle of consistent interpretation (section 4). Th e fi nal section focuses 
on two substantive areas of EU policy where the application of the principle 
of consistent interpretation in relation to certain EU rights has been more 
problematic (section 5) before some concluding remarks are made. At the time 
of writing, the UK remains a full member of the EU, but is engaged in negotiating 
its withdrawal from EU in accordance with Art. 50 TEU . Where appropriate 
and possible to do so at a time of great uncertainty, reference will be made to 
the UK ’ s withdrawal from the EU and the future application of the principle of 
consistent interpretation in the UK courts. 
 1.1. THE UK AS A MEMBER STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 In his famous Zurich Speech in 1946, Sir Winston Churchill, who had been 
the UK ’ s Prime Minister during the Second World War, called for  “ a kind of 
United States of Europe ” to secure peace, safety and freedom on mainland 
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 14  EFTA, an intergovernmental organisation, which promotes free trade and economic 
integration, was established in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Finland became an associate member in 1961 
and a full member in 1986. Iceland joined in 1970. Liechtenstein joined in 1991. Many 
members subsequently left  to join the EU. Current membership comprises of Iceland, 
Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. To participate in the EU ’ s Single Market, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are also members of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and subject to the authority of the EFTA Surveillance Authority and EFTA Court. 
Switzerland has a bilateral agreement with the EU. 
 15  Th e French President Charles de Gaulle was suspicious of the UK ’ s close relationship with 
the US. 
 16  Note that Great Britain (GB) refers to England, Wales and Scotland. 
 17  Th e UK ’ s Offi  ce for National Statistics annual mid-year estimate released on 23 June 2016 
stood at 65,110,000 as of 30 June 2015.  < https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationand
community/populationandmigration/populationestimates > . 
 18  29 votes each. See also the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee with 24 votes each. 
 19  Th e 73 MEPs are divided as follows: Wales (4), Scotland (6), Northern Ireland (3) and 
England (60). 
Europe. At  that time, he did not envisage the UK being part of this political 
construct: the UK still had strong links with the Commonwealth. In 1960, the 
UK joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with six other European 
states who were unable or unwilling to join the then European Economic 
Community (EEC). 14 Th e UK fi nally joined the original six Member States to 
become a member of the EEC on the 1 January 1973 at the same time as the 
Republic of Ireland and Denmark. Two previous attempts to join in 1961 and 
1963 had been vetoed by France. 15 Th e UK, which consists of four countries, 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, 16 is one of the largest Member 
States of the EU  with a population of just over 65 million. 17 To refl ect its 
status, it has the same number of votes as France, Italy and Germany in the 
Council of the European Union 18 and 73 MEPs 19 in the European Parliament. 
 Th e UK ’ s relationship with the EU has been complex and it has not 
followed the same path of integration as the other Member States. Some key 
developments are charted below. Not long aft er accession in 1973, a referendum 
was held on EU membership in 1975 resulting in a  “ yes ” vote by 67 per cent with 
a 65 per cent turnout. In 1984, Margaret Th atcher, the British Prime Minster, 
successfully negotiated what has been termed the  “ UK rebate ” , a complex fi nancial 
correction to the UK ’ s annual contribution to the EU budget. In the negotiations 
leading up to the Maastricht Treaty, the UK secured opt-outs from Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Social Chapter and was instrumental 
in incorporating the principle of subsidiarity into the Treaties to prevent
  “ competence creep ” . Th e election of a new Labour Government in 1997 led 
to the adoption of the Social Chapter under the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
three opt-outs relating to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
A referendum was promised in the Labour Party manifesto on the 
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 20  Th e European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 was enacted to give eff ect to the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
 21  Protocol 30 which also applied to Poland. 
 22  A number of new  passerelle provisions were inserted into the Treaties by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Th ey allow for revision of the voting requirements (e.g. from unanimity to QMV) or legislative 
procedures (from special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure) by the 
European Council or Council without having to resort to Treaty revision. Th e Treaties now 
contain a general  passerelle provision (Art. 48(7) TEU) and six sectoral  passerelle provisions 
(Art. 153(2), last subpara., TFEU; Art. 192(2) last subpara., TFEU; Art. 31(3) and (4) TEU; 
Art. 312(2) 2nd subpara., TFEU; Art. 81(3) TFEU; Art. 333 TFEU. 
 23  For consideration of the legal and political complexities of the Act, see  P.  Craig ,  “ Th e 
European Union Act 2011 :  Locks, limits and legality ” ( 2011 )  48  Common Market Law Review 
 1915 – 44 . 
 24  Th e Act did not contain any provisions setting out the procedure for leaving the EU if this 
was the result of the referendum vote. 
Constitutional Treaty 2004, but this was withdrawn once France and the 
Netherlands had failed to ratify the Treaty. A similar promise to off er a 
referendum was not pursued for the Treaty of Lisbon 2009. 20 Th e UK secured 
opt-ins in relation to the AFSJ and Schengen. A Protocol was agreed on the 
application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the UK courts. 21 With 
the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government 2010–2015, the 
European Union Act 2011 was passed, which requires any amendment to the 
TEU or Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) made by Treaty, and any 
use of the  passerelle provisions, 22 to be approved by an Act of Parliament at least, 
and that a referendum should be held in a number of cases where this would 
enlarge EU competence or reduce safeguards such as unanimous voting. 23 
 1.2. THE UK ’ S EXIT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 In January 2013, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron delivered his 
 “ Bloomberg speech ” in which he promised to seek renegotiation of the UK ’ s 
membership of the EU and subsequently hold a referendum on UK membership 
if a Conservative Government was elected to offi  ce in 2015. Th is was indeed the 
case and the European Union Referendum Act 2015 was enacted committing 
to an advisory referendum to be held by the end of 2017. 24 In November 2015, 
David Cameron presented his proposals for renegotiation to the EU. Th ese 
were accepted by Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, in 
February 2016. Th is arguably  “ minimalist ” new settlement for the UK within the 
European Union centred on four themes: economic governance, competitiveness, 
sovereignty and immigration. A referendum was held on 23 June 2016 which 
asked voters whether they wished to remain as a member of the EU or leave 
the EU. It is no exaggeration that the result in which 51.9 per cent voted to 
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 25  More than 30 million people voted and it was the highest turnout in a UK-wide vote since 
the 1992 general election. 
 26  For a range of views, see  S.  Douglas-Scott ,  “ Brexit, Article 50 and the contested British 
Constitution ” ( 2016 )  79 ( 6 )  Modern Law Review  1019 – 40 ;  R.  Craig ,  “ Casting aside clanking 
medieval chains: Prerogative statute and Article 50 aft er the EU referendum ( 2016 )  79 ( 6 ) 
 Modern Law Review  1041 – 63 ;  G.  Phillipson ,  “ A dive into deep constitutional waters : 
 Article 50, the prerogative and Parliament ” ( 2016 )  79 ( 6 )  Modern Law Review  1064 – 89 . 
 27  Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [ 2016 ]  EWHC 2768 (Admin). Th e judgment 
was delivered on 3 November 2016, and its light of its huge importance, it was made 
available immediately online at  < www.judiciary.gov.uk > . 
 28  Both parties in the proceedings agreed that it was not possible for Art. 50 TEU to be 
revoked once triggered. Th is common agreement was accepted by both the High Court and 
the Supreme Court, and no referral for a preliminary ruling was made to the ECJ under 
Article 267 TFEU. 
 29  Th e fully televised hearing was held for four days in December 2016:  < www.supreme
court.uk > . 
leave and 48.1 per cent to remain with a 71.8 per cent 25 turnout sent shockwaves 
throughout the world and had immediate economic, political, constitutional, 
sociological, cultural and psychological ramifi cations for the four countries 
which make up the UK, with the potential for further tremors hitting the 
UK and rest of the EU for some time, probably years. 
 Th e UK will be the fi rst Member State to leave the EU (oft en referred to 
as  “ Brexit ” ). Art. 50 TEU is the Treaty provision introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon which sets out the procedure for withdrawal by a Member State from 
the EU. Art. 50(1) TEU states that  “ Any Member State may decide to withdraw 
from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements ” . In 
the aft ermath of the referendum result, a legal vacuum was revealed in the 
UK constitutional settlement, and diff erent political and legal views emerged as 
to the nature of the UK ’ s  “ constitutional requirements ” in this situation, 26 and 
the scope of parliamentary sovereignty. Th e UK Government considered that it 
had the power to invoke Art. 50 TEU and inform the European Council of its 
intention to withdraw from the EU triggering the negotiation process through 
the exercise of its prerogative (executive) powers in international aff airs. 
Th is view was challenged successfully before the High Court of England 
and Wales in  Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union . 27 
In a  surprise decision, the court ruled that the Government could not proceed 
without the prior authorisation of Parliament. 28 A leap-frog appeal directly 
to the Supreme Court was permitted. In January 2017, 29 the Supreme Court 
upheld the decision of the High Court confi rming that the Government 
could not trigger Art. 50 TEU unilaterally and needed the authority of the 
Westminster Parliament. However, it ruled that the consent of the three 
devolved assemblies was not required. Th e Government promptly introduced 
the European Union (Notifi cation of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 , a mere 133 words. 
It was passed by both Houses of  Parliament and received Royal Assent on 
16 March 2017. Its enactment paved the way for the Prime Minister to inform 
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 30  K.  Syrett ,  Th e Foundations of Public Law: Principles and Problems of Power in the British 
Constitution ( 2nd ed., Palgrave ,  2014 ),  p. 132 . 
 31  Ibid., p. 132. 
 32  Ibid., p. 9. 
 33  Ibid. Syrett also notes that although the English Civil War of the 1640s did see the adoption 
of two successive documents which could have been described as constitutions, these did not 
survive the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. 
 34  Bradley  and Ewing ,  Constitutional and Administrative Law ( 14th ed., Pearson ,  2007 ),  p. 4 . 
the  European  Council on the 29  March 2017 of the UK ’ s intention to leave 
the EU in accordance with Art. 50 TEU triggering the two-year timeframe 
for negotiating a withdrawal agreement by 29 March 2019. At the time of 
writing,  this complex and highly political process is on-going, and a detailed 
account is outside the scope of this contribution. 
 2. THE UK AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
 Th e constitutional setting of the UK has some unique characteristics which 
need  to be considered in order to appreciate the context within which the 
principle of consistent interpretation has been applied by the UK judiciary, and 
to allow for comparison with the application of the principle in other Member 
States as set out in this volume. 
 2.1. A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 
 Th e UK can be characterised as having a constitutional monarchy similar to 
some other EU Member States: Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Sweden. 30 Th e monarch is nominally the head of government, but the incumbent, 
currently Queen Elizabeth II, does not exercise any eff ective political power 
in reality. 31 
 2.2. AN UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
 One of the most striking characteristics of the UK ’ s constitutional settlement is 
the absence of a codifi ed constitution: there is no one document which sets out 
the authority of the main organs of government or the relationship between these 
organs or with the people. Th e UK is  “ virtually unique ” in this respect 32 and it 
refl ects  “ the absence of a historical break such as a civil war or independence ” 
which elsewhere has normally led to a new written constitutional settlement. 33 
Th at said, the UK does have a constitution in the much wider sense in that it 
has a whole system of government established and regulated by a collection of 
rules. 34 Th e system is founded on a complex mix of statutes, court judgments, 
constitutional principles, constitutional conventions and international treaties. 
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 Th e written constitution of the majority of the EU ’ s Member States set out a 
number of key features including the division of tasks of government, whether 
unitary or federal, a list of fundamental rights beyond the reach of the organs 
of government and adhere to the separation of powers. In the UK, these gaps 
are fi lled by the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament and the 
rule of law. Fundamental rights protection was enhanced by the introduction 
of the Human Rights Act 1998. It made the fundamental rights set out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) legally enforceable before 
UK courts for the fi rst time. 
 2.3.  LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY OR PARLIAMENTARY 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 Th e concept of legislative supremacy is of fundamental importance. It is 
also referred to as the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Traditionally, 
Parliament is deemed to be the supreme law-maker. Importantly, this concept 
is encapsulated by the common law doctrine of implied repeal . 35 Th is means 
that any Act of Parliament may be changed by a subsequent Act on the same 
subject matter without the need to explicitly repeal the earlier statute. In essence, 
Parliament cannot bind it successors. Th is raises the question as to how the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty can be reconciled with EU law, particularly 
where it has been well established by the ECJ that in the event of a confl ict 
between EU and national law, EU law is supreme. 36 Th is is discussed below 
in section 2.6. 
 2.4. DEVOLUTION 
 Th e Blair Administration 1997 introduced devolution in Scotland and Wales 
and was committed to a peace deal for Northern Ireland under the terms of 
Th e Good Friday Agreement (1998) . Th ere are now three devolution settlements 
which diff er quite considerably in nature, and which confer law-making powers 
on the Scottish Parliament , the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly . Th e legislative power of Parliament can extend to all of the UK 
(or just to Great Britain or just to one or more of the countries within the UK). 
 Th e UK referendum on withdrawal from the EU has given rise to political 
tensions between the Westminster Government and its devolved counterparts. 
Th e majority of voters in England and (surprisingly) Wales voted to leave 
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 37  England: Remain 46.6 % (13,266,996); Leave 53.4 % (15,188,406); Turnout 73 % ; Wales: 
Remain 47.5 % (772,347); Leave 52.5 % (854,572); Turnout 71.7 % . Th e result in Wales came 
as a surprise to the political establishment since Wales is a net benefi ciary of EU funding. 
 38  Scotland: Remain 62 % (1,661,191); Leave 38 % (1,018,322); Turnout 67.2 % . Northern Ireland: 
Remain 55.8 % (440,707); Leave 44.2 % (349,442); Turnout 62.7 % . 
 39  Th ey have since been joined by Cyprus. Note that Scotland has a hybrid system which is a 
mix of common law and civil law elements. 
 40  Syrett (n. 30), p. 214. 
 41  See further, Alan Trench,  “ A legal jurisdiction for Wales ? ” at  < www.devolution.matters.
wordpress.com > accessed 06.11.17. 
 42  High Court of England and Wales, Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Supreme Court, 
Senior Courts in Northern Ireland (High Court and Court of Appeal) and Scotland (High 
Court of the Justiciary and Court of Sessions). Other jurisdictions: Isle of Man, Channel 
Islands, Privy Council  – Commonwealth countries elect to use this body, whose members 
are made up of Supreme Court judges, as a fi nal court of appeal. 
 43  Employment Appeal Tribunal, VAT and Duties Tribunal, Crown Court, Immigration Appeals 
Tribunal, employment tribunals, magistrates, Social Security Commissioner and specialist 
competition courts. 
the EU. 37 In contrast, in both Scotland and Northern Ireland, the majority of 
the electorate voted to remain a member of the EU. 38 
 2.5. A COMMON LAW SYSTEM 
 Th e UK, together with the Republic of Ireland, were the fi rst countries with 
common law legal systems to join the EEC. 39 A common law system is where 
court judgments are a source of the constitution. It is accepted that judges 
make law through the development of the case-law. Th is judge-made law can 
take the form of common law (laws and customs declared to be law by judges 
since early times) and interpretation of statute law. Diff erent rules on statutory 
interpretation have emerged from the case-law, including their interface with 
the EU principle of consistent interpretation. In accordance with the doctrine 
of precedent , the decisions of the superior courts are binding on inferior 
courts (and may bind other superior courts). It should be noted that within 
the hierarchy of legal norms, legislation takes precedence over common law 
because Parliament is supreme. 40 
 Th ere are three diff erent legal systems in the UK. Scotland and Northern 
Ireland have their own legal systems/jurisdiction. At present, England and Wales 
have a combined legal jurisdiction, although there is a continuing debate about 
whether Wales should have a separate jurisdiction in view of the emergence of 
Welsh law post-devolution. 41 
 Th e UK has a unitary court system, 42 but there are specialised courts and 
tribunals in the fi elds of employment, immigration, tax, intellectual property 
and competition which have all embraced the application of the principle of 
consistent interpretation. 43 Th e Supreme Court (since 2009, formerly the 
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House  of Lords ) is the fi nal and highest court in the UK (in all matters bar 
criminal law in Scotland). Only the higher courts (the High Court , Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court in England and Wales) have powers of judicial 
review . Th ere are some cases in which the principle of consistent interpretation 
has been applied in the Northern Irish and Scottish courts and the approach 
taken by the judiciary is the same. 
 2.6.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UK LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (INCLUDING THE EU TREATIES 
AND THE EU ACQUIS) 
 Th e UK has a dualist system requiring an Act of Parliament to be adopted in 
order for an international treaty to have legal eff ect. Th e European Communities 
Act (EC Act) 1972 was enacted to give internal eff ect to EU law in the UK and 
has been amended on subsequent occasions to give eff ect to all the amendments 
to the original EEC Treaty. Section 2(1) states that: 
 All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created 
or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time 
to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are 
without further enactment to be given legal eff ect or used in the United Kingdom shall 
be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; 
and the expression  “ enforceable Community right ” and similar expressions shall be 
read as referring to one to which this subsection applies. 
 Th is provision makes the concept of direct applicability and direct eff ect part 
of UK law and places an obligation on the UK courts to enforce any directly 
eff ective EU measures without any further acts of implementation. 
 Section 2(2) provides for the implementation of EU obligations (such as 
directives), even where this requires national legislation and Acts of Parliament 
to be replaced by an Order in Council or statutory instrument rather than by 
primary legislation. 
 Section 3 amounts to a constitutional instruction to the domestic courts to 
act as  “ Union courts ” 44 and renders judgments of the ECJ authoritative in the 
UK courts. It states that: 
 For the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or eff ect of 
any of the Treaties, or as the validity, meaning or eff ect of any Community instrument, 
shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the European Court, be for 
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 45  R (IDT Card Services Ireland Ltd) v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [ 2006 ]  EWCA Civ 29 , 
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[ 1990 ]  ECR I-2433 . 
determination as such in accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant 
decision of the European Court or any court attached thereto). 
 Th ere is no provision in the EC Act 1972 which declares that EU law is supreme 
in the event of a confl ict. Instead, there is a  “ rule of construction ” contained 
in s. 2(4). Th e relevant part states that  “ any enactment passed or to be passed 
[subject to certain exceptions]  … shall be construed and have eff ect subject to 
the foregoing provisions of this section ” . Th is section, in conjunction with s. 2(1), 
has enabled the UK courts to interpret national law to comply with EU law. 
 In relation to the principle of consistent interpretation, Arden LJ in  IDT Card 
Services stated that  “ Th e 1972 Act thus contains the mandate for the English 
courts to interpret domestic legislation in accordance with applicable Union 
directives ” . 45 
 Th ere has been considerable debate in the UK as to how parliamentary 
sovereignty can be reconciled with the supremacy of EU law. Prior to the 
 Factortame 46 judgment of the House of Lords, the approach of the UK courts 
and the extent to which they felt bound to apply the principle of consistent 
interpretation was directly entwined with their view of parliamentary 
sovereignty, and is refl ected in the fi rst period of case-law identifi ed in this 
contribution and discussed below (section 3.1). A direct confl ict between the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and (putative) directly eff ective EU law 
rights emerged during the  Factortame litigation and had been the subject of a 
preliminary ruling. 47 Lord Bridge famously stated that: 
 Some public comments on the decision of the Court of Justice, affi  rming the 
jurisdiction of the courts of member states to override national legislation if necessary 
to enable interim relief to be granted in protection of rights under Community 
law, have suggested that this was a novel and dangerous invasion by a Community 
institution of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. But such comments 
are based on a misconception. If the supremacy within the European Community of 
Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the 
EEC Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Th us, whatever limitations 
of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities 
Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the 1972 Act it has always been 
clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering fi nal judgment, 
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to override any rule of national law found to be in confl ict with any directly enforceable 
rule of Community law. Similarly, when decisions of the Court of Justice have exposed 
areas of United Kingdom statute law which failed to implement Council directives, 
Parliament has always loyally accepted the obligation to make appropriate and prompt 
amendments. Th us there is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to 
rules of Community law in those areas to which they apply and to insist that, in the 
protection of rights under Community law, national courts must not be inhibited by 
rules of national law from granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no more than a 
logical recognition of that supremacy. 48 
 Th us, the conceptual basis for the acceptance of the supremacy of EU law lies 
with national constitutional law rather than an acceptance of the monist view 
of supremacy of the EU ’ s Court of Justice. 49 EU law is supreme over confl icting 
national law on the basis of the Parliament ’ s enactment of the EC Act 1972. 
 In the subsequent case of  Th oburn, 50 (also known as the  “ Metric Martyrs 
case ” ), Laws LJ considered that some statutes have special signifi cance. Th ese 
so-called  “ constitutional statutes ” are not subject to the doctrine of  implied repeal 
(discussed earlier) and must be  expressly repealed in a later statute with the clear 
intention of Parliament. Th is approach was confi rmed by the Supreme Court in 
its  HS2 judgment. 51 Th e EC Act 1972 and HRA, as well as the statutes setting out 
devolution are considered to fall within this category of  “ constitutional statutes ” 
and must be expressly repealed by Parliament. 
 2.7.  THE STATUS OF EU LAW FOLLOWING THE UK ’ S 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EU 
 Withdrawal from the EU requires Parliament to expressly repeal the EC 
Act 1972. Th e Prime Minister, Th eresa May, announced plans for a  “ Great Repeal 
Bill ” at the Conservative Party Conference in October 2016 which would repeal 
the EC Act 1972 on the date that any withdrawal agreement with the EU comes 
into force. Th e Government introduced the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 
to Parliament in July 2017. It received Royal Assent on 26 June 2018. Th e main 
aim of the Act is to put in a place a legal framework which will maximise legal 
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 52  Over 400 amendments to the Bill were tabled by parliamentarians as it proceeded through 
the House of Commons. 
 53  Th e Queen ’ s Speech 2017 includes proposals for a Customs Bill, Trade Bill, Immigration Bill, 
Fisheries Bill, Agriculture Bill, Nuclear Safeguards Bill and International Sanctions Bill. 
certainty on the day that the UK leaves the EU (exit day). In summary, the key 
features of the Act are as follows: 
 –  It repeals the EC Act 1972 on exit day. 
 –  It incorporates the EU acquis in force in the UK on exit day into national 
law. 
 –  It grants delegated powers to Ministers to amend/repeal retained EU law 
which does not operate eff ectively or is deemed defi cient. 
 –  It allows the UK Government to freeze the power for the devolved assemblies 
to amend retained EU law. 
 –  It removes the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
 –  It removes the general principle of supremacy of EU law. 
 –  It removes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights . 
 –  Th e principle of state liability  will expire two years aft er exit day. 
 In November 2017, the Minister for Exiting the European Union announced 
that a separate Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill would 
be enacted in order to give eff ect to the fi nal Withdrawal Agreement 
between the UK and the EU in domestic law including any implementation 
(or transition) period that is agreed. 
 It is unsurprising that huge political and constitutional controversy affl  icts 
each stage of the UK ’ s exit from the EU. 52 Withdrawal from the EU represents 
a new chapter in the history of the UK. It requires the UK ’ s constitutional 
framework to be re-drawn and new relationships with the EU and non-EU 
States to be forged. Th is will not only pave the way for the  “ de-Europeanisation ” 
of UK law, but also the development of new regulatory frameworks. In the 2017 
Queen ’ s Speech, the UK Government announced that it would introduce 
a number of Bills to re-regulate key policy areas such as immigration and trade 
in order to ensure that the UK  “ makes a success of Brexit ” . 53 
 3.  THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION IN THE UK COURTS 
 It has been asserted by Sir Rupert Cross that the approach of members of the 
judiciary to statutory interpretation at any one time will refl ect their own 
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 54  J.  Bell and  G.  Engle (eds.),  Cross ’ s Statutory Interpretation ( 3rd ed., Butterworths ,  1995 ),  p. 10 . 
 55  [1989] AC 66. 
 56  Th e Equal Pay Act 1970 had been amended by the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983 
in order to bring UK law in line with EU law. Th e Regulations had been presented to 
Parliament as intending to give eff ect to the ECJ ’ s ruling in Case 61/81,  Commission v. 
UK where the ECJ had ruled that the UK law did not comply with EU law in place. 
 57  Previously Art. 119 EEC and Art. 141 EC. 
 58  Litster and Others v. Forth Dry Dock  & Engineering Co Ltd (In Receivership) and Another 
[ 1990 ]  1 AC 546 . 
 59  Th is provides for the safeguarding of employees ’ rights on the transfer of a business. 
 60  Indeed, the House of Lords implied words into the national regulations. 
 61  [1988] 1 All ER 626. 
 62  [1990] 2 AC 407. 
perception of their constitutional role. 54 Th is study identifi es three phases in the 
application of the principle of consistent interpretation by the UK courts. 
 3.1.  PHASE ONE: INITIAL REACTION OF THE UK COURTS 
POST- VON COLSON 
 Th is fi rst phase illustrated the challenge facing the judiciary and its approach 
to statutory interpretation where there was a confl ict between a literal reading 
of national law and EU law. Where the national law at issue had been enacted 
expressly by Parliament to give eff ect to EU law, the UK courts followed the 
 Von Colson judgment and interpreted national law to comply with the later 
EU law. Th e principle was fi rst applied by the House of Lords in  Pickstone v. 
Freemans plc in 1989, 55 to bring the Equal Pay Act 1970 which had been amended 
by the Equal Pay (Amendments) Regulations 56 in line with the (broader) 
interpretation of the principle of equal pay enshrined in Art. 157 TFEU 57 
and fl eshed out in Directive 75/117 (the  “ Equal Pay Directive ” ). Th e use 
of the principle was confi rmed by the House of Lords in  Litster in 1990 58 in 
which the TUPE (the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)) 
Regulations 1981) had been expressly enacted to give eff ect to Directive 77/187 
(the  “ Acquired Rights Directive ” ). 59 Th e House of Lords had no qualms in 
adapting the national law to give eff ect to the Directive and where necessary 
 “ implying words which would achieve that eff ect ” . 60 
 In contrast, and at the same time, the House of Lords refused to interpret 
 pre-existing national legislation to comply with EU law that had been enacted 
at a later date. While the court recognised the interpretative duty, in both  Duke 
v. GEC Reliance in 1988 61 and  Finnegan v. Clowney Youth Training Programme 
Ltd in 1990, 62 the House of Lords denied any role to the Equal Treatment 
Directive 76/207 in the interpretation of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
because it had been adopted  aft er the enactment of the Act of Parliament, 
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 66  Ibid., p. 117. 
 67  [1993] 1 CMLR 259, at paras. 19 – 21 (Lord Keith of Kinkel). 
 68  Case C-32/93,  Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [ 1994 ]  ECR I-3567 . 
even though the UK accepted that the 1975 Act represented fulfi lment of its 
obligations under the 1976 Directive. 63 As a consequence of this policy by 
the UK courts (and the lack of horizontal direct eff ect of directives), in both 
cases the female employees were denied their EU rights as they were unable to 
rely on the Directive against their  private employer ’ s retirement policy which 
they claimed was discriminatory. Th ese gaps in the protection of individuals ’ 
EU rights were compounded by a failure to refer to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling under Art. 267 TFEU. Docksey and Fitzpatrick argued that  “ the House 
of Lords has ensnared itself in a principle of statutory interpretation which 
is entirely, [and now aft er  …  Marleasing ,] erroneously dependent upon 
notions of parliamentary intent which are inconsistent with the principle of 
supremacy of Community law ” . 64 For them, the House of Lords had failed to 
appreciate that a new canon of construction had been introduced by the ECJ in 
 Von Colson which overrides both constitutional limitations and the doctrine of 
 stare decisis 65 and which takes precedence over other canons of interpretation. 66 
It is for this reason that the judiciary entered into a second phase in its 
relationship with the principle of consistent interpretation. 
 3.2.  PHASE TWO: ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE 
POST- MARLEASING 
 Following the judgment of the House of Lords in  Factortame in October 1990 
and the ECJ ’ s ruling in  Marleasing the following month, in which it expressly 
confi rmed that the interpretative obligation set out in  Von Colson applied 
to  pre-existing national law, the full scope of the obligation as a method of 
statutory interpretation being accepted by the UK judiciary can be seen. Th is 
is illustrated by the House of Lords 1993 decision in  Webb (No. 2) v. EMO 
Air Cargo (UK) Ltd, 67 a legal dispute between two private parties involving 
the correct interpretation of the Equal Treatment and Pregnancy Directives. 
Following a referral to the Court of Justice, 68 the House of Lords interpreted the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to include direct discrimination on the grounds 
of pregnancy. Signifi cantly, the House of Lords was required to ignore any 
reference to a male comparator in discrimination cases, as required by national 
law. Th is was despite the fact that the Court of Appeal had earlier considered 
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 69  Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [ 1992 ]  1 CMLR 793 , para. 53. 
 70  [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557. 
 71  Th ere is also a duty to ensure that all new law enacted is compliant with the HRA. 
 72  Per Lord Steyn, para. 45. 
 73  Per Lord Steyn, para. 48. 
 74  Per Underhill LJ, para. 40. 
 75  Joined Cases C-397/01 – 403/01,  Pfeiff er [ 2004 ]  ECR I-8835 . See further,  S.  Drake , 
 “ Twenty  years aft er  Von Colson :  Th e impact of  ‘ indirect eff ect ’ on the protection of the 
individual ’ s Community rights ” ( 2005 )  30  European Law Review  329 – 48 . 
that this could only be achieved  “ by distorting the meaning of the British 
statute ” , 69 a view not expressly rejected by the House of Lords prior to making a 
reference. 
 3.3.  PHASE THREE: IMPACT OF SECTION 3 OF THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT 1998 
 A third phase can be identifi ed in the approach of the UK courts since the 
House of Lords 2004 judgment in  Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza. 70 Th is case 
concerned the scope of another new interpretative obligation placed on 
UK courts by s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which requires UK 
legislation to be interpreted in a manner which is compliant with the HRA. 71 
Th e House of Lords considered at length the scope of the interpretative 
obligation set out in s. 3 and drew parallels with the EU principle of consistent 
interpretation. Lord Steyn referred expressly to the fact that the draft ers 
had modelled s. 3 on the EU interpretative obligation. 72 He also recalled the 
judgments of the House of Lords in  Pickstone and  Litster to illustrate the 
strength of the interpretative obligation. 73 For Lord Rodger, it was signifi cant 
that Parliament had adopted the same wording for the HRA as that expounded 
by the Court of Justice in  Marleasing and he considered that the judiciary 
should follow a similar approach to that adopted in  Pickstone and  Litster . 
Consequently,   Ghaidan is now seen by the judiciary as the leading authority 
on the EU principle of consistent interpretation in the UK courts. In its 2014 
decision in  Jessemey v. Rowstock Ltd , the Court of Appeal referred to the fact that 
the decision of the House of Lords in  Ghaidan amounts to an  “ assimilation ” of 
the interpretative obligations set out in  Marleasing and s. 3 HRA. 74 
 Th is assimilation is interesting given that there are diff erences in the 
construction and operation of the interpretative obligations. Th e EU principle 
of consistent interpretation is a judge-made constitutional principle of EU law 
established by the ECJ. It does not have an explicit legal basis in the Treaties, but 
the Court has based its reasoning on the rule of law, Art. 4(3) TEU (together 
with Art. 288 TFEU), the principle of  eff et utile , and in  Pfeiff er , it even went 
as far as to say that the duty was  “ inherent in the system of the [Treaties] ” . 75 
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 77  Case C-334/92,  Wagner Miret [ 1993 ]  ECR I-6911 . 
 78  Not all of them. 
 79  Nevertheless, it is intended that Parliament respond to the declaration of incompatibility. 
Th e HRA makes provision for the off ending legislation to be amended by a fast-track 
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 80  Ibid., 82. For an insight into the draft ing of the HRA, see  F.  Klug ,  Values for a Godless Age:  Th e 
Story of the UK ’ s New Bill of Rights ( Penguin ,  2000 ) . 
Th e ECJ has recognised its limitations, particularly where it may confl ict with 
general principles of law (e.g. non-retroactivity in criminal matters ), 76 or 
where an outcome compliant with EU law would require the court to overstep 
its interpretative role and venture into the domain of policy-making which 
would be contrary to the doctrine of the separation of powers. In  Wagner 
Miret , the ECJ implied that a national court is not required to interpret national 
law  contra legem . 77 
 In contrast, the HRA was enacted by Parliament in 1998 to enable national 
courts to give eff ect to the ECHR and came into force in 2000. An election 
manifesto commitment of the Blair Administration, it required national courts 
to interpret national law  “ as far as possible ” in compliance with the ECHR. 
Where an interpretation is not  “ possible ” under s. 3, the national court 78 has 
a discretionary power to make a  “ declaration of incompatibility ” . It is then for 
Parliament to remedy any failure of compliance on the part of national law with 
the  “ Convention right ” set out in the HRA. Th e legislation in question remains 
valid and there is no obligation on Parliament to take any action. 79 Th us, in 
direct contrast to directly eff ective EU law under the EC Act 1972 (and more 
recently the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), national courts do not have 
the power to set aside primary legislation emanating from the Westminster 
Parliament, only devolved legislation. O ’ Cinneide describes the HRA as 
achieving a  “ delicate constitutional balance: it leaves parliamentary sovereignty 
intact, while modifying the legal framework which governs how British courts 
interpret and give eff ect to primary legislation ” . 80 
 To date, the courts have refuted any arguments put forward by legal counsel 
which try to diff erentiate between the two methods of interpretation in terms of 
their scope. It is suggested that the extent to which the principle of consistent 
interpretation has been embedded in the practice of the UK courts refl ects the 
fact that the judiciary are more comfortable anchoring a method of statutory 
interpretation derived from EU law, with its contested legal basis and fl uid 
nature, to a national method which has a statutory basis in an Act of Parliament. 
Th e national courts are impliedly reinforcing the view of the centrality of the 
Parliament in the UK constitutional system, particularly in determining the 
UK ’ s relationship with the EU. 
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 3.4.  PHASE FOUR: THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION POST-BREXIT 
 Since the UK ’ s withdrawal from the EU will entail the express repeal of the EC 
Act 1972, the current mandate on the UK judiciary to interpret national law to 
comply with EU law will disappear. Th ere is no doubt that a fourth phase in the 
application of the principle of consistent interpretation by the UK judiciary will 
emerge post-Brexit. It is argued that this will be predicated on the judiciary ’ s 
understanding of Parliament ’ s intention as expressed in the EU (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018. It is possible to discern some broad guidance on how the national 
courts should interpret  “ retained EU law ” in the Act itself. 
 Th e EU (Withdrawal) Act provides for the EU acquis which is in force in 
the UK on exit day to be retained in the UK legal order. Th is  “ nationalised ” law 
will be called  “ retained EU law ” . It includes directly applicable law including 
regulations, decisions, delegated and implementing acts, domestic law enacted 
to give eff ect to EU directives, and directly eff ective (Treaty) rights. It also 
includes the jurisprudence of the ECJ as on exit day, and general principles of 
EU law as recognised by the ECJ. Th e Act expressly excludes the application 
of the principle of supremacy to any law made on or aft er exit day, but it 
continues to apply in the event of a confl ict between national law and retained 
EU law. Th e Act expressly excludes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the principle of state liability has been strictly curtailed. Despite giving the 
appearance that the existing EU acquis will be retained providing legal certainty, 
it is highly likely that it will be substantially amended to give eff ect to the 
Withdrawal Agreement, either through primary or secondary legislation. 
 One major concern has been the potential loss of rights which have been 
enjoyed by individuals as a result of the UK ’ s membership of the EU. Th e Act 
expressly provides that directly eff ective rights in force before exit day will 
remain part of UK law. However, the Act expressly excludes rights which are 
derived from EU directives and which are  “ not of a kind ” recognised by the 
ECJ or a national court in a case decided before exit day. Th is clause could limit 
the protection of individuals ’ rights if interpreted as meaning that provisions 
which are suffi  ciently clear and precise to be justiciable may not be enforceable 
by an individual  simply because this status had not yet been recognised by 
the ECJ or national court on exit day . 
 Th e Act, when read in conjunction with the Explanatory Notes, includes 
a new mandate for the national judges to continue to apply the principle of 
consistent interpretation when interpreting retained EU law. Th e Explanatory 
Notes state that: 
 Th e principle of supremacy  … means that domestic law must be interpreted, as far 
as possible, in accordance with EU law. So, for example, domestic law must be 
interpreted, as far as possible, in light of the wording and purpose of relevant 
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Brexit ” ,  BBC News , 8 August 2017;  Lady Hale (incoming President of the Supreme Court) , 
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the interpretation of retained EU law ”  UK Constitutional Law Blog ( 27 November 2017 ) . 
Available at  < https://ukconstitutionallaw.org > . 
directives. Whilst this duty will not apply to domestic legislation passed or made on 
or aft er exit day, subsection (2) preserves this duty in relation to domestic legislation 
passed or made before exit. 81 
 Th e Act also states that the principle of supremacy (and, it is argued the principle 
of consistent interpretation), applies to pre-exit law which is amended on or aft er 
exit day if that is the intention of the modifi cations. Th is would be in keeping 
with the UK courts ’ approach to statutory interpretation which is to give eff ect 
to Parliament ’ s intention. 
 Th e Explanatory Notes state further that when interpreting retained EU law, 
national court can adopt 
 … a purposive approach to interpretation where the meaning of the measure is unclear 
(i.e. considering the purpose of the law from looking at other relevant documents 
such as treaty legal base for a measure, its recitals and preambles, and the  ‘ travaux 
preparatoires ’ (working papers) leading to the adoption of the measure). It also 
means applying an interpretation that renders the provision of EU law compatible 
with the treaties and general principles of EU law. Non-binding instruments, such 
as recommendations and opinions, would still be available to a court to assist with 
interpretation of retained EU law aft er exit. In these circumstances, the principle of 
supremacy continues to apply to EU retained law  enacted before exit day . 82 
 Pre-Brexit case-law of the ECJ will be considered binding precedent for 
the lower courts. Th e Supreme Court will not be bound to follow retained 
EU case-law, but if it wishes to depart from it, it must follow the same (strict) 
rules that apply when it wishes to depart from one of its own precedents. 
 Th ere is less certainty with regard to the status of the post-Brexit case-law of 
the ECJ. Th is jurisprudence will no longer bind the UK courts, and they will not 
be able to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ if they require assistance in 
interpreting retained EU law. Th e original version of the Bill permitted national 
courts to refer to ECJ case-law if it considers it  “ appropriate to do so ” . In response 
to calls for clearer instructions by senior members of the judiciary 83 and legal 
scholars, 84 the Government agreed to amend the text to state that national courts 
could refer to ECJ judgments where  “ relevant. ” Th ere was clearly a concern 
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 91  Arden LJ in  IDT Card Services Ireland Ltd v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [ 2006 ] 
 EWCA Civ 29 , at para. 75. 
that any reference to judgments of the ECJ by the UK judiciary, however 
 “ appropriate ” from a legal perspective, could be deemed politically unacceptable. 
 4.  THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY OF CONSISTENT 
INTERPRETATION IN THE UK COURTS 
 4.1. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE UK COURTS 
 Historically, three common law methods of statutory interpretation have 
evolved before the UK courts: (a) the literal rule in which the normal meaning 
is conferred on the statutory words; (b) the golden rule which starts with a 
literal approach , but it is amended if the result would be absurd or inconsistent 
with the rest of the statute; (c) the mischief rule whereby the court identifi es a 
defi ciency (or  “ mischief  ” ) in the law and interprets the rule to stop the mischief 
reoccurring. 85 More contemporary practice also incorporates a fourth method, 
(d) the purposive approach where if the wording is unclear or ambiguous, 86 the 
contested provision(s) should  “ be read in the context of the statute as a whole, 
and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation 
which led to its enactment ” . 87 In  Pepper v. Hart, 88 the House of Lords ruled 
that a broad range of materials may be taken into account to ascertain the true 
meaning of a provision as intended by Parliament, including the offi  cial record 
of parliamentary proceedings in  Hansard subject to certain limitations. 89 
 Th e principle of consistent interpretation derived from EU law is seen as 
 additional to the standard rules on statutory interpretation which have developed 
through the case-law. It is also broader and more fl exible going beyond the 
limitations set out in  Pepper v. Hart , and may apply even if the national law is not 
ambiguous. 90 It has been considered by Arden LJ to be the standard approach 
to interpreting legislation enacted to give eff ect to international treaties. 91 
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 94  Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority [ 2012 ]  UKSC 22 . 
 95  Case C-105/3,  Criminal proceedings against Pupino [ 2005 ]  ECR I-5285 . In this case, the ECJ 
extended the principle of consistent interpretation to Framework Decisions which had been 
enacted under the Th ird Pillar in accordance with Art. 34(2)(b) TEU, an analogous provision 
to Art. 249 EC (now Art. 288 TFEU) which defi nes the characteristics of directives. Th e ECJ 
based the obligation on the principle of loyalty set out in Art. 10 EC (now Art. 4(3) TEU). Th e 
judgment was of signifi cant constitutional importance as the Member States had expressly 
prohibited Framework Decisions from having direct eff ect. See  M.  Fletcher ,  “ Extending 
 ‘ indirect eff ect ’ to the third pillar: the signifi cance of  Pupino ? ” ( 2005 )  30 ( 6 )  European Law 
Review  862–77 . 
 96  Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority [ 2012 ]  UKSC 22 , per Lord Mance, paras. 198 – 218. 
 97  Dabas v. High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain [ 2007 ]  2 AC 31 , per Lord Bingham at para. 5; 
 Calderelli v. Judge of Preliminary Investigations of the Court of Naples, Italy [ 2008 ]  UKHL 51 , 
per Lord Bingham at para. 22. 
 Th e most recent UK cases refer to  Pfeiff er 92 and accept the full scope of the 
obligation imposed on them under EU law. In the latter case, the ECJ clearly 
stated that the interpretative obligation applies not only to national law that 
implements the directive, but to the national legal system as a whole. It held 
that to ensure that a directive is fully eff ective:  “ … the principle of interpretation 
in conformity with Community law thus requires the referring court to do 
 whatever lies within its jurisdiction, having regard to the whole body of rules of 
national law . ” 93 
 Th e UK courts also adopt a number of presumptions when engaging in 
statutory interpretation including the principle of legality which assumes that 
legislation created by Parliament is in accordance with the rule of law and does 
not infringe fundamental principles of constitutional or administrative law. It is 
now accepted that there is a parallel presumption that assumes that legislation 
is adopted to comply with international treaties and EU law (unless there is an 
express intention to the contrary). 94 
 Th ere has been some confusion in the UK case-law before the Supreme 
Court on the application of the  Pupino variant of the principle of consistent 
interpretation. 95 In  Assange , 96 the Supreme Court found that the  Pupino 
judgment was not binding on UK courts and could not be applied to interpret 
national law (Extradition Act 2003) in line with the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW) Framework Decision despite having been applied in previous decisions 
of the fi nal court in  Dabas and  Calderelli . 97 Th e EAW had been adopted under 
Title VI of the Th ird Pillar, and had not been given eff ect under s. 2 of the 
EC Act 1972. At the time, it constituted an intergovernmental measure subject 
to domestic methods of statutory interpretation including the presumption 
that Parliament has legislated to give full eff ect to the UK ’ s international legal 
obligations. So while the adoption of the domestic approach did not change 
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the outcome of the case itself, it reveals the constitutional complexities arising 
from the UK ’ s diff erentiated integration with the EU in some policy areas. 98 
 4.2.  METHODOLOGY OF THE UK COURTS IN CASES 
INVOLVING EU LAW 
 It is important at the outset to understand the approach of the national judge 
when engaging in interpretation in a case involving EU law. First, the judge will 
be required to ascertain the correct meaning of the EU source of law at issue. 
Th is may (but not always) require a reference under Art. 267 TFEU to the ECJ if 
the meaning is unclear. 99 
 It is at the second stage that the national judge will need to give eff ect to 
EU law. Early on in the UK literature, Docksey and Fitzpatrick argued that 
the principle of consistent interpretation should be the fi rst obligation that 
the national court must address. 100 It is only if it fails that resort should be 
had to direct eff ect. 101 Th ey concluded that  “ … the application of the indirect 
eff ect principle can be perceived as the natural basis upon which the rights 
in a directive reach Community citizens. It can also be seen as a signifi cant 
alternative to direct eff ect, given that it is untrammelled by the vertical/
horizontal eff ect distinction ” . 102 However, in general, the approach of the UK 
courts is to fi rst consider whether the application of direct eff ect is possible 
before turning to the principle of consistent interpretation. In later cases, there 
tends to be no mention of the doctrine of direct eff ect if the dispute arises 
between two private parties. 103 
 For the most part, the UK courts have embraced their EU interpretative 
duty and have not referred questions to the ECJ specifi cally on the scope of 
the principle itself. For the UK courts, the focus is very much on achieving an 
EU-compliant outcome rather than on the process of interpretation itself. 104 
Further, following a preliminary ruling on an interpretation of a substantive 
provision, the national courts have followed the interpretation set out by the 
ECJ. Th ere is some evidence in the case-law that where possible, judges may 
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 Jessemey v. Rowstock Ltd [ 2014 ]  3 CMLR 24 . 
 107  Swift  v. Robinson [ 2014 ]  UKSC 50 . 
 108  United States of America v. Nolan [ 2015 ]  UKSC 63 . 
determine that it is more legitimate to adopt a national statutory method of 
interpretation, as was the case in  White v. White (discussed in section 5). It is 
not clear why this is the case, although it was suggested in  Jessemey obiter by 
Underhill LJ that this would avoid future litigation, for example, where a dispute 
arises over the same part of the statute but in a domestic only case which would 
need to be re-litigated. 
 4.3.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU DUTY 
OF CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION AND SECTION 3 HRA 
 It is in determining the scope of the obligation of the duty of consistent 
interpretation that an  “ assimilation ” with the approach adopted under s. 3 of 
the HRA can be seen. A summary given by legal counsel on the scope of the duty 
was approved by Sir Andrew Morritt C in the Court of Appeal in  Vodafone 2 
v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners 105 and has since become the principal 
reference point for the judiciary. 106 It was endorsed by the Supreme Court in 
 Swift  107 and  Nolan . 108 It stated that: 
 In summary, the obligation on the English courts to construe domestic legislation 
consistently with Community law obligations is both broad and far-reaching. In 
particular: 
 (a)  It is not constrained by conventional rules of construction (per Lord Oliver in 
 Pickstone at 126B); 
 (b)  It does not require ambiguity in the legislative language (per Lord Oliver in 
 Pickstone at 126B; Lord Nicholls in  Ghaidan at 32); 
 (c)  It is not an exercise in semantics or linguistics (see  Ghaidan per Lord Nicholls 
at 31 and 35; Lord Steyn at 48 – 49; Lord Rodger at 110 – 115); 
 (d)  It permits departure from the strict and literal application of the words 
which the legislature has elected to use (per Lord Oliver in  Litster at 577A; 
Lord Nicholls in  Ghaidan at 31); 
 (e)  It permits the implication of words necessary to comply with Community law 
obligations (per Lord Templeman in  Pickstone at 120H–121A; Lord Oliver in 
 Litster at 577A); and 
 (f)  Th e precise form of the words to be implied does not matter (per Lord Keith 
in  Pickstone at 112D; Lord Rodger in  Ghaidan at para. 122; Arden LJ in 
 IDT Card Services , at 114). 
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 It is also clear to the UK judiciary that it is for them to determine whether or 
not domestic legislation can be interpreted in a way which conforms with the 
applicable EU law. 109 Limitations on this interpretative duty are recognised 
by the national judiciary, and these are a matter for the national court. 
In  Vodafone 2 v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners , it was held that: 
 Th e only constraints on the broad and far-reaching nature of the interpretative 
obligation are that: 
 (a)  Th e meaning should  “ go with the grain of the legislation ” and be  “ compatible 
with the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed. ” (per Lord Nicholls 
in  Ghaidan at 33; Dyson LJ in  EB Central Services , at 81). An interpretation should 
not be adopted which is inconsistent with a fundamental or cardinal feature of 
the legislation since this would cross the boundary between interpretation and 
amendment; (see  Ghaidan per Lord Nicholls at 33; Lord Rodger at 110–113; 
Arden LJ in  IDT Card Services at 82 and 113) and 
 (b)  Th e exercise of the interpretative obligation cannot require the courts to 
make decisions for which they are not equipped or give rise to important 
practical repercussions which the court is not equipped to evaluate. 
(See  Ghaidan per Lord Nicholls at 33; Lord Rodger at 115; Arden LJ in 
 IDT Card Services at 113.) 
 4.4. APPLICATION OF THE DUTY IN PRACTICE 
 Th e strong interpretative obligation set out in EU law has led the UK courts 
to what may seem to some to be surprising results. To illustrate the strength 
and lengths to which the UK courts are prepared to interpret national law, 
a few examples are given. What is clear is that (i) the principle is applied in 
parallel with s. 3 of the HRA and (ii) the scope of the duty is broader and more 
fl exible than methods of interpretation set out in national law. Lord Mance, 
writing extra-judicially, considers that the  Marleasing principle goes beyond the 
domestic (common) law presumptions, and allows a  “ quite radical reading in, 
out or down of words in legislation in the fi eld of EU law ” . 110 
 4.4.1. Writing New Provisions into a Statute 
 When exercising their interpretative duty, national courts are permitted 
to add words to a statute which are not there. Th is is not considered by the 
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UK judiciary as going beyond a court ’ s interpretative role (i.e. interpretation 
 contra legem ) as long as the interpretation is consistent with the  “ grain ” of the 
legislation (discussed below). It was evident from the earliest phase that the 
House of Lords 111 considered it within its remit to imply the words necessary 
to construe national law in accordance with EU law. Th e  Litster case concerned 
the correct interpretation of Acquired Rights Directive 112 which safeguards 
the rights of employees when their employer ’ s undertaking is transferred to 
another company. Th e UK implementing legislation protected persons who 
were  “ employed immediately before the transfer ” . Th e employer in question 
had become insolvent and had entered receivership. At issue was whether the 
national provision set out above covered employees who were dismissed by 
receivers one hour before the transfer. Th e House of Lords held that, to give 
eff ect to the underlying directive as interpreted by the Court of Justice, there 
had to be read into the words  “ a person so employed immediately before the 
transfer ” the words  “ or who would have been so employed if he had not been 
unfairly dismissed in the circumstances described in regulation 8(1) ” . 113 A literal 
interpretation would not suffi  ce. In other words, the House of Lords made a 
signifi cant change to the wording of the legislation by adding words that were 
not there, even where the wording of national law was not ambiguous. Arden LJ 
later noted that this would not be possible under purely domestic law and would 
probably be regarded as  “ impermissible judicial legislation. ” 114 
 Moving to our third phase, the judgment in  EBR Attridge Law LLP v. 
Coleman 115 is a good example of how far the national courts are willing to go to 
give full eff ect to EU law. In this case, the national court was prepared to write 
a new paragraph into the statute in order to give full eff ect to the principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of disability in a dispute between an employee 
and her employer. 
 Mrs Coleman worked for a law fi rm and was the principal carer for her 
disabled son. She had resigned from her post claiming that she had been the 
victim of unlawful discrimination by her employer on account of her son ’ s 
disability (so-called  “ associative discrimination ” ). Mrs Coleman brought 
legal proceedings in 2005 against her employer for unlawful discrimination 
contrary to the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) and unfair dismissal. 
Th e DDA did not apply to associative discrimination, but Mrs Coleman argued 
the statute should be construed to include associative discrimination which, 
in her view, was unlawful under Directive 2000/78, which establishes a general 
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framework for equal treatment and occupation (the  “ Framework Directive ” ). 116 
Th e DDA had been amended to give eff ect to the Framework Directive with 
eff ect from 1 October 2004. 117 
 Th e Employment Tribunal (ET) referred the matter to the ECJ 118 which 
confi rmed that the eff ectiveness of the Directive would be undermined if it did 
not outlaw associative discrimination. 119 On return to the ET, and in line with her 
original decision, the judge was of the view that the DDA could be interpreted 
to give eff ect to the Directive by  “ supplying words if necessary ” unless it 
contained  “ an express and unambiguous indication to the contrary ” . 120 
 Th is judgment was appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) on 
the grounds that (a) the judge had  “ distorted and rewritten ” the DDA by reading 
in words to render associative discrimination unlawful; and (b) the judge had 
erred in stating that the duty to interpret applied from the date that the UK 
had given eff ect to the Directive through the enactment of amending legislation 
(1 October 2004) and that any duty arose only aft er the fi nal and extended date 
for implementation of the Directive which was later (2 December 2006). In 
their view, this date had not passed at the time of the alleged acts or omissions 
took place. 121 
 Th e EAT dismissed both grounds of appeal. 122 With regard to the principle 
of consistent interpretation, Underhill J referred to  Marleasing as the leading 
authority from the ECJ. He acknowledged that the UK courts and tribunals 
had accepted that the duty may in certain circumstances allow the national 
court to  “ read words into a statute in order to give eff ect to EU legislation 
which the statute was evidently intended to implement ” 123 and cited the earlier 
cases of  Pickstone and  Litster . Yet, he also acknowledged that such an approach 
is not always legitimate and that determining what is or is not possible is a 
diffi  cult task. 124 Th e judge considered in depth the approach of the House of 
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 126  Ibid., citing the EAT decision in  Showboat Entertainment Centre Ltd v. Owens [ 1984 ]  ICR 65 
approved by the Court of Appeal in  Weathersfi eld Ltd v. Sargent [ 1999 ]  ICR 425 . He noted 
that this view was not undermined by the fact that the Disability Discrimination Act referred 
to  “ a disabled person ” . 
 127  Case C-144/04,  Mangold v. Helm [ 2005 ]  ECR I-9981 . In this case, the ECJ held that the 
principle of age discrimination at issue was not derived from the Directive but refl ected 
the principle of equal treatment which is found in international instruments and in the 
Lords in  Ghaidan referring to the judgments of Lords Nicholls, Steyn and 
Rodgers, and noted that the  Ghaidan approach had been applied subsequently 
by the Court of Appeal in the context of an EU law case,  IDT Card Services 
Ireland Ltd v. Customs and Excise Commissioners . He applied the approach 
to the  EBR Attridge Law LLP v. Coleman case and confi rmed the duty to 
interpret the DDA in accordance with the meaning of the Directive as now 
interpreted by the ECJ. Underhill J stated that: 
 there is nothing  “ impossible ” about adding words to the provisions of the 1995 Act so 
as to cover associative discrimination. No doubt such an addition would change the 
meaning of the 1995 Act, but, as the speeches in  Ghaidan make clear, that is not in itself 
impermissible (see, e.g. per Lord Nicholls as paras. 32-33). Th e real question is whether 
it would do so in a manner which is not  “ compatible with the underlying thrust of the 
legislation ” (per Lord Nicholls at para.33) or which is  “ inconsistent with the scheme 
of the legislation or its general principles ” (per Lord Rodger at para 121). In  Ghaidan 
the majority were prepared to interpret the words  “ wife or husband ” in Schedule 1 
of the Rent Act 1977 as extending to the same-sex partners. Th at was plainly not the 
intention of Parliament when the act was enacted, nor does it correspond to the actual 
meaning of the words, however liberally construed; but the implication was necessary 
in order to give eff ect to Convention rights and it went  “ with the grain of the legislation ” 
(in Lord Rodgers ’ s phrase). In my view the situation with which I am concerned is 
closely analogous. Th e proscription of associative discrimination is an extension of 
the scope of the legislation as enacted, but it is in no sense repugnant to it. On the 
contrary, it is an extension fully in conformity with the aims of the legislation as draft ed. 
Th e concept of discrimination  “ on the ground of disability ” will remain central. 125 
 Th e judge also referred to the fact that other discrimination statutes in the UK, 
as interpreted by the UK courts  without reference to EU law , outlaw associative 
discrimination, which for him demonstrated that such a result was in line with 
UK policy on anti-discrimination legislation. 126 In relation to the actual text, 
the judge recommended inserting an additional and distinct provision to the 
statute to give eff ect to the ECJ ’ s interpretation of the Framework Directive in 
the particular circumstances. 
 On the issue of when the duty arises, he dismissed the arguments based 
on the case of  Lloyd-Briden v. Worthing College in which the ET and EAT 
had both refused to apply the ECJ ’ s (controversial) decision in  Mangold 127 
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 134  Note that the leading judgment was delivered by Underhill LJ, who was also the single judge 
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to disapply national law that confl icted with the principle of age discrimination 
in relation to events which occurred prior to the date for implementation of 
the Directive (i.e. 2 December 2006). In his view,  Mangold was distinguishable. 
He also dismissed the argument that the interpretative duty did not arise until 
the date for implementation had passed as held by the ECJ in  Centrosteel . 128 
For Underhill J, these cases were distinguishable as the UK had implemented 
legislation purporting to give eff ect to the Directive within the implementation 
deadline. For him, 
 the  “ Marleasing obligation ” must bite at the moment when those Regulations came into 
force: it is logically irrelevant that the legislator chose to act rather sooner than he was 
obliged to. I would also add that it would be bizarre if the (amended) 1995 Act meant 
one thing on 2 December 2006 but something diff erent on 3 December. 129 
 Th e case was subsequently returned to the lower ET for damages to be assessed, 
but was settled out of court. Th e UK subsequently enacted the Equality Act 2010 
which amalgamated all of the UK ’ s discrimination legislation under one statute 
and expressly includes protection against associative direct discrimination. 130 
 4.4.2. Correcting Draft ing Errors 
 It is recognised that UK courts may not only engage in statutory interpretation 
to resolve ambiguities in statutes, but also to correct obvious draft ing 
errors. Th is may include adding, substituting or omitting words. 131 In these 
circumstances, the judicial role is confi ned to construing the law and judges 
should not give the appearance of engaging in  “ judicial legislation ” . 132 
In   Jessemey v. Rowstock Ltd , 133 the principle of consistent interpretation was 
utilised by the Court of Appeal to correct draft ing errors made by Parliament 
when consolidating legislation on discrimination in the shape of the Equality 
Act 2010 to bring it into line with EU law. 134 
 Mr Jessemey had been dismissed by his employer, Rowstock Ltd, on the 
ground that he was over 65 years old. Mr Jessemey brought proceedings under 
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national employment law for unfair dismissal and age discrimination. When 
he tried to fi nd another job, his former employer gave him a poor reference. 
Mr Jessemey believed that the poor reference was in response to the legal 
claims that he had brought and so instigated a further claim against his 
employer for victimisation. 
 Th e EAT 135 held that while post-employment discrimination and 
harassment was explicitly prohibited under the Equality Act 2010, 136 which 
implemented the Framework Directive and Directive 2006/54 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment 
of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), post-
employment victimisation was not. According to the EAT, there was no 
equivalent provision proscribing victimisation which was only referred to in 
s. 108(7). Th e EAT was of the view that it was not  “ possible ” to interpret such 
behaviour as unlawful when the statute clearly states that is not unlawful. Th is 
would go beyond the duty to interpret  “ as far as possible ” set out in  Ghaidan . 
Two months later, in  Onu v. Akwiwu, 137 a diff erently-constituted EAT held that 
the 2010 Act  did prohibit acts of victimisation against former employees. 
 A clear lack of clarity had arisen in the law which may in itself seem 
surprising in light of the earlier decision of the Court of Justice in  Coote. 138 
In the latter case, the ECJ had held that protection from discrimination on 
grounds of equality in employment matters conferred on employees by the 
Equal Treatment Directive 139 also applied to victims of sex discrimination 
who had been victimised on account of making a claim of sex discrimination 
either while employed or aft er the employment relationship had ended. When 
the preliminary ruling returned to the EAT, the referring national court, the 
principle of consistent interpretation was utilised to interpret national law to 
comply with the Directive in this dispute between two private parties. It was 
held that the phrase  “ in the case of a woman employed by him ” covered the 
case of a former employee. Th e interpretation of EU law set out in  Coote had 
subsequently been applied by the House of Lords in a number of appeals heard 
together relating to all three  “ fi rst generation ” discrimination statutes  – the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995. 140 
 When  Jessemey came before the Court of Appeal, Underhill LJ, now 
promoted from the EAT, and clearly familiar with the scope of the principle 
of consistent interpretation, held that since post-employment victimisation 
was unlawful prior to the enactment of the Equality Act 2010, the failure of the 
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statute to proscribe this behaviour was a draft ing error and did not refl ect the 
intention of Parliament. 141 Indeed, this would have been contrary to EU law 
as confi rmed in  Coote . Th e Court of Appeal was of the view that the  Ghaidan 
approach permits words to be implied into the Equality Act 2010 to achieve the 
result of rendering post-termination employment victimisation unlawful since 
it would be  “ consistent with the fundamental principles of the Act itself and 
 ‘ go with its grain ’ ” . 142 Th e Court of Appeal rejected the approach of the EAT 
and recalled the need to consider the fl exibility of the  Ghaidan approach and 
the broader context in which the law has evolved. 143 
 4.5. LIMITATIONS:  “ GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN ” 
 It is important to consider the circumstances in which the national courts 
have considered that it is not  “ possible ” to interpret national law to comply 
with EU law and the legal and practical consequences that ensue. It should be 
recalled that in  Vodafone 2 , the Court of Appeal set out two key limitations. 
First, the national court should ensure that: 
 Th e meaning should  “ go with the grain of the legislation ” and be  “ compatible with the 
underlying thrust of the legislation being construed. ” (per Lord Nicholls in  Ghaidan at 
33; Dyson LJ in [ EB Central Services Ltd v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2008] 
EWCA Civ 468] at 81). An interpretation should not be adopted which is inconsistent 
with a fundamental or cardinal feature of the legislation since this would cross the 
boundary between interpretation and amendment; (see  Ghaidan per Lord Nicholls 
at 33; Lord Rodger at 110–113; Arden LJ in  IDT Card Services at 82 and 113). 
 Second, that the: 
 exercise of the interpretative obligation cannot require the courts to make decisions 
for which they are not equipped or give rise to important practical repercussions 
which the court is not equipped to evaluate. (See  Ghaidan per Lord Nicholls at 33; 
Lord Rodger at 115; Arden LJ in  IDT Card Services at 113.) 
 4.5.1. Determining the Boundaries 
 Th ese limitations are clearly designed to preserve the boundaries between the 
role of the national courts as interpreters of the law rather than as law-makers. 
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For the judiciary, the objective or purpose of the national legislation is 
paramount, and even if a consistent interpretation is possible in principle, if 
it entail practical consequences which the national court does not have the 
competence to address, the national court should refrain from adopting the 
 Marleasing principle. 
 Where the boundary lies was discussed by the Court of Appeal in 2015 in 
 Google Inc v. Vidal-Hall 144 in which it was held that the  Marleasing principle 
could not be applied. In this case, a dispute had arisen between two private 
parties, and concerned the transposition of the Data Protection Directive into 
UK law. Th e Court fi rst sought to determine whether on a literal interpretation, 
the national implementing law correctly transposed the relevant EU law. It 
considered that the national provision 145 was more restrictive than EU law, 146 
i.e. that the term  “ damage ” contained in the Data Protection Act should not 
be restricted to pecuniary damage only and prohibit claims for non-pecuniary 
loss or moral damages. It followed that the Directive had not been eff ectively 
transposed, 147 and denied the claimant of an eff ective remedy for breach 
of her privacy as protected by the Directive as well as Art. 7 and 8 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Th e second issue was whether it was 
possible to interpret national law in such way as to give full eff ect to Directive 
which it purported to implement. Th e Court of Appeal was of the view that the 
application of the  Marleasing principle in this case was not possible. In her 
judgment, Sharp LJ recalled Lord Rodger ’ s phrase in  Ghaidan , 148 namely that 
the interpretation should not led to a change that  “ goes against the grain ” of the 
legislation. She went on to set out the litmus test: 
 Th e question must always be whether the change that would result from the 
proposed interpretation (whichever interpretative technique is adopted) would alter 
a fundamental feature of the legislation. It will not be  “ possible ” to interpret domestic 
legislation, whether by reading in, reading down or disapplying a provision, if to do so 
would distort or undermine some important feature of the legislation. 149 
 Th e Court of Appeal held that the exclusion of the right to damages for distress 
where certain conditions are not satisfi ed is a fundamental feature of the statute, 
and this refl ected a deliberate intention on the part of Parliament to limit the 
compensation available in the event of a breach. Th e national court could not 
fi nd an explanation in the statutory text itself or in Hansard to explain the 
restriction. Th ere was no evidence that could be provided that could indicate 
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to the court what Parliament had intended on this issue and which could give 
the national court some scope for interpretation. 150 While the national court 
accepted that the interpretative duty may involve disapplying a part of national 
law to make it compatible with EU law, 151 it held that this would be a step too 
far in this case. Th e provision was considered to be a central feature of the 
legislation and it was clear that Parliament had enacted a  “ carefully calibrated 
scheme ” which restricted the compensation available to victims. 152 Nevertheless, 
an alternative method of securing Ms Vidal-Hall ’ s right to damages for 
distress was possible in this case (see below). 
 4.5.2. What Happens When a Consistent Interpretation is Not  “ Possible ” ? 
 In the absence of direct eff ect, if a consistent interpretation is not possible, this 
may leave a gap in the judicial protection that an individual can obtain where 
their EU right has been breached. It should be noted that unlike the HRA, there 
is no power imposed on national courts by EU law or national law to make 
a declaration of incompatibility stating that national law incompatible with 
EU law will trigger an amendment to national law. 
 4.5.2.1. Principle of State Liability 
 In EU law, the ECJ has long held the view that the alternative remedy is to bring 
an action for damages against the state for breach of EU law. 153 Th is approach is 
recognised by the UK courts as illustrated in  Google Inc v. Vidal-Hall. Th e option 
was not explored any further as it was not necessary to secure an outcome for the 
case. 154 Yet, it is also well established that an action for damages is no panacea 
and subject to conditions and limitations which curtail its eff ectiveness as an 
alternative remedy. 155 It should be noted that the European Union (Withdrawal) 
Act expressly provides for the removal of the  Francovich remedy from UK law 
aft er two years. 
 4.5.2.2. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 Prior to the UK ’ s EU referendum result, it is argued that the UK courts had 
been adopting a very  communautaire approach when interpreting and applying 
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the EU ’ s Charter of Fundamental Rights. In  Google Inc , the Court of Appeal 
held that the  Marleasing principle was not applicable, and relied on Art. 47 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) to disapply the off ending 
primary legislation. Th e same approach had been utilised by the Court of 
Appeal in an earlier case,  Benkharbouche v. Sudan and  Janah v. Libya , 156 where 
Art. 47 was used to disapply the State Immunity Act 1978 which denied the 
claimants a right of access to a court for alleged breaches of the national law 
giving eff ect to the Working Time Directive. 
 Th ere is evidence that following the EU referendum result, the Supreme 
Court is adopting a more cautious approach and moving away from reliance 
on Art. 47 EUCFR to secure individuals ’ rights. On appeal in  Benkharbouche v. 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff airs, Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Aff airs and Libya v. Janah , 157 the Supreme Court 
relied on customary international law and Art. 6 ECHR to grant the claimants 
the  procedural right of access to a court. Th e Supreme Court referred to Art. 47 
EUCFR very briefl y, stating that it did not raise a separate issue to be addressed. 
It did acknowledge that where there is a confl ict with national law, EU law 
must prevail and the former disapplied, and that, in contrast, where there is 
a breach of Art. 6 ECHR, a declaration of incompatibility is the only remedy 
(under s. 4 HRA). However, EU law was not relied upon to resolve the dispute. 
Similarly, in  Unison , the Supreme Court briefl y referred to Art. 47 EUCFR before 
relying on common law principles to reach the same result. 158 Th e European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act removes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
from UK law. Yet, the role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights before 
UK courts is in decline even before the UK has withdrawn from the EU. In both 
cases discussed above, the Supreme Court was able to guarantee fundamental 
rights of individuals independently of EU law. 
 4.6. LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 A degree of legal uncertainty is inherent in the operation of the principle of 
consistent interpretation. 159 One of the criticisms of the EU principle is its 
strength and breadth. To what extent can it be considered acceptable that 
the employers in  Webb ,  Coote ,  Attridge and  Jessemey were subject to legal 
obligations of which they would have been unaware ? Is this consistent with the 
rule of law ? Th ere is a view that this level of legal uncertainty is an acceptable 
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trade-off  between,  “ on the one hand, the legitimate expectations of the 
individual seeking to have purely national law applied, and, on the other hand, 
the need to ensure the widest enforcement possible of Community law, along 
with the protection of the rights of individuals originating in Community 
law ” . 160 Furthermore, the limitations on interpreting national law  contra legem 
or in breach of general principles of law could be considered to be suffi  cient 
safeguards in respecting the rule of law. It could also be argued that much 
of the litigation would not arise if the Member States implemented EU law 
in their own legal orders correctly (estoppel argument). 
 Th e UK judiciary seems have some sympathy with concerns about legal 
certainty for parties who may be subject to unforeseen legal obligations, but it is 
limited and, in general, it has not been suffi  cient to override their duty to apply 
a consistent interpretation. In  IDT Card Services, 161 the principle of consistent 
interpretation was adopted in a complex case concerning the interpretation of 
national law purporting to implement the Sixth EC VAT Directive 162 which 
raised an issue of  “ novelty and diffi  culty ” . Essentially, as the rules in the UK 
and Republic of Ireland diff er, they had given rise to circumstances in which 
a VAT-free scenario had arisen. Arden LJ acknowledged that there was an 
argument against applying the  Marleasing principle based on legal certainty and 
the legitimate expectations of the taxpayer. However, she was of the view that 
it was well known that the VAT Act 1994 had to be interpreted in conformity 
with the Sixth VAT Directive and that the supply of telecommunications 
services amounts to a taxable supply for the purposes of the Directive. 163 In 
 British Gas Trading v. Lock , 164 Sir Colin Rimer expressed some sympathy for the 
fact that the  “ correct ” interpretation of Art. 7 of the Working Time Directive had 
emerged several years aft er it had come into force through a later interpretation 
of the EU provision by the ECJ, but proceeded to interpret national law in 
line with EU law. In 2002, Betlem argued that if the legislature  “ voluntarily ” 
accepted the levels of legal uncertainty created by s. 3 HRA, which had in turn 
been inspired by the EU interpretative principle, then the same acceptance 
should be accorded to legal uncertainty resulting from the application 
of the  Marleasing principle. Th is is even more compelling given that the 
UK legislature considered the insertion of an interpretative obligation into the 
HRA preferable to permitting courts to set aside confl icting legislation as in 
the case of direct eff ect. 165 
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consolidated into a single instrument: Directive 2009/103/EC. 
 167  Th e fi rst agreement of this nature dates back to 1945. See further  J .  Davey and  C .  Richards , 
 “ Direct but ineff ective ? Th e Second Motor Insurance Directive ” ( 1999 )  Journal of Business 
Law  157 . 
 168  See e.g. specialist UK solicitor fi rms like Nicholas Bevan and Leigh Day solicitors. 
 169  See e.g. in  Churchill Insurance Company Ltd v. Fitzgerald Wilkinson; Evans v. Cockayne  & 
Equity Claims Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport [ 2012 ]  EWCA Civ 1166 where following 
a referral to the ECJ in Case C-442/10,  Churchill , the court (and all the parties including the 
intervening Secretary of State for Transport) accepted that an interpretation conforming to 
EU law was possible, but the disagreement centred on the form of the words to be inserted 
into the Road Traffi  c Act 1988. 
 5.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION IN THE UK COURTS 
 Th ere are two specifi c policy areas where the eff ectiveness of the UK courts ’ 
approach in relation to the principle of consistent interpretation has been called 
into question. Th is undermines its potency as a key weapon in the armoury of 
individuals who are seeking to invoke or protect their EU rights before national 
courts which have been infringed, and particularly in the absence of direct 
eff ect. 
 5.1. MOTOR INSURANCE DIRECTIVES 
 Th e  nature of the implementation of the EU Motor Insurance Directives 166 
into UK law is unconventional and includes relying on existing statutes such 
as the Road Traffi  c Act 1988 , and the continued use of historic  private law 
agreements between the Department of Transport and the Motor Insurance 
Bureau . 167 Th is hotchpotch legal framework has given rise to many of the 
defi ciencies in the transposition of EU law into national law and resulted in 
extensive litigation before the UK and the emergence of specialist lawyers in 
the fi eld. 168 Th e application of the principle of consistent interpretation has had 
mixed results. In this policy area, there seems to be a more cautious approach 
on the part of the judiciary to using the  Marleasing principle. Compared to the 
fi eld of employment law, the UK courts seem much more reluctant to insert 
new provisions into national law to ensure compliance with EU law even where 
this would seem to be demanded by interpretations of the law delivered in the 
judgments of the ECJ. In contrast, where there has been a referral by a UK court, 
the referring court has been more willing to adopt a conform interpretation of 
national law in line with EU law. 169 
 One restriction on the use of the principle of consistent interpretation 
arose in the House of Lords 2001 decision in  White v. White. Th e case involved 
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a number of disputes (joined on appeal) concerning the enforcement of the 
EU ’ s  Second Motor Insurance Directive 170 which requires Member States 
to establish a compensation fund for the victims of uninsured drivers and 
 “ hit and run ” accidents. In the UK, these obligations were given eff ect through 
private law contractual arrangements between the Department for Transport 
and the Motor Insurance Bureau, the body responsible for paying compensation 
claims. Th e litigation refl ects the general approach to the enforcement of 
EU rights before national courts with direct eff ect being considered fi rst, 
followed by the principle of consistent interpretation, and fi nally the principle 
of state liability. 171 At fi rst instance, the trial judge resolved the issue through 
recourse to the doctrine of direct eff ect. 172 Th e Court of Appeal 173 held that 
the trial judge had erred in law in relying on direct eff ect. Further, it refused 
to adopt the principle of consistent interpretation on the grounds that the 
private law contractual arrangements purporting to give eff ect to the Directive 
could not be categorised as  “ national law ” for the purpose of the  Marleasing 
principle. Similarly, the House of Lords declared that the relevant provisions 
of the Directive were insuffi  ciently precise to have direct eff ect, and then 
considered that the  Marleasing principle could not be used as an alternative 
method of giving eff ect to the Directive. Lord Nicholls held that the principle 
of indirect eff ect  “ cannot be stretched to the length of requiring contracts to 
be interpreted in a manner that would impose on one or other of the parties 
obligations which, the  Marleasing case apart, the contract did not impose ” . 174 
Fortunately for the claimant, Lord Nicholls resolved the dispute by drawing 
on a domestic variant of statutory interpretation. He held that, even though 
the  Marleasing principle could not apply in this context,  “ I consider that the 
application of the conventional [contract law] principles of interpretation 
of documents arrives at the same result ” . 175 Lord Cooke argued that the EU 
version could have been used. 
 Although the practical result for the claimant was the same, the UK ’ s 
unconventional transposition of the Directive through non-legislative means 
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 183  EUI Ltd v. Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [ 2012 ]  EWCA Civ 1267 . For criticism of 
this decision, see  N.  Bevan ,  “ Marking the Boundary ” ( 2013 )  3  Journal of Personal Injury 
Law  151 . 
 184  See  Delaney v. Secretary of State for Transport [ 2014 ]  EWHC 1785 (QB) . 
combined with the refusal by the House of Lords to apply the  Marleasing 
principle to private law agreements created unacceptable levels of legal 
uncertainty and a lacuna in the eff ective protection of individuals ’ rights before 
the national courts. It was hoped that the ECJ would chastise the UK ’ s method 
for transposing the Directive into national law in  Evans . 176 Th e Advocate 
General had been highly critical of the UK ’ s implementing approach and 
considered it to be  “ fraught with so many imponderables that it fails to satisfy 
the requirements of legal certainty  … ” . 177 He called on the national courts to use 
the  Marleasing principle to rectify this legal uncertainty. 178 In his view, failing 
to do so because of the constraints of national law meant that the Directive had 
not been implemented correctly into UK law. 179 Unfortunately, the ECJ adopted 
a more deferential and pluralist approach and made no direct reference to the 
 Marleasing principle. Th e Court clearly did not want to be drawn on the UK ’ s 
implementation of the Directive by a private law agreement, or on the reliance of 
the national courts on domestic principles of interpretation. It is argued by this 
author that the ECJ would prefer the UK courts to resolve the issues themselves. 
Indeed, in  White , the end result for the claimant was the same. Nevertheless, in 
the interests of legal certainty, the eff ective judicial protection of the individual ’ s 
Union rights, and to avoid unnecessary litigation, there have been calls for 
the ECJ to be more explicit to avoid any confusion on the part of the national 
court in the future. 180 
 Further legal uncertainty has arisen in this area of law in more recent 
litigation. For example, in  Bristol Alliance Partnership v. Williams, EUI Ltd, 181 
the  Marleasing principle was adopted by the High Court to interpret the Road 
Traffi  c Act 1988 and the 1999 MIB Agreement to bring national law in line with 
the EU Motor Insurance Directives as interpreted by the ECJ in  Bernaldez . 182 
However, this ruling was overturned by the Court of Appeal which held that 
the ECJ ruling was not of  “ general application. ” 183 A subsequent successful 
 Francovich damages claim in  Delaney II 184 casts doubt on this view and lawyers 
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have called for the Department of Transport ’ s systemic failure to fully implement 
the Motor Insurance Directives to be addressed. 185 An investigation for non-
compliance by the European Commission under Art. 258 TFEU is not yet 
complete. 
 A great deal of legal uncertainty has arisen following the ECJ ’ s judgment 
in  Vnuk 186 in which the Court held that the concept of  “ use of vehicles ” as 
set out in the First Motor Insurance Directive 187 which covers  “ the use of a 
vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of that vehicle ” includes the 
use of a tractor with a trailer attached, in a farmyard, in order to reverse into 
a barn. Furthermore, it is  implicit in  Vnuk that the liability extends to private 
land such as the farmyard in the main proceedings. Th is means that UK motor 
insurance law as it currently stands is incompatible with EU law. In a UK case, 
 UK Insurance Ltd v. Holden , 188 a claim was brought in which a car had caught 
fi re while being repaired on private land and had spread to an adjacent building 
causing extensive damage. Th e insurer of the property paid out over  £ 2million 
and then sought an indemnity from the car owner, Mr Holden, and his motor 
insurer, UK Insurance Ltd. Th e motor insurer claimed that the policy did not 
cover the claim as the incident took place on private land and did not entail 
the  “ use ” of the car. In accordance with national law, third party liability only 
arises in relation to accidents when the car is being driven or used on a public 
road or other public place. Before the High Court, the judge denied the claim 
on the basis that the repair of the car did not amount to use. However, the judge 
considered obiter that the Road Traffi  c Act 1988 (s. 145(3)) which refers to the 
use of vehicle  “ on a road or other public place ” did not comply with EU law 
following  Vnuk . He did not consider it appropriate to apply the principle of 
consistent interpretation in this case since to even insert the word  “ including ” 
before  “ on a road ” into the Act to bring it in line with EU law would  “ go against 
the grain ” of the Act of Parliament and amount to an amendment rather than 
an interpretation of the law. He held obiter that 
 Th e addition of that single word belies  … the scale of the change. It may be that 
extending the ambit of the Act in this way does not in practice lead to many more 
claims especially given the need to have requisite use of the vehicle but nonetheless, this 
is potentially a signifi cant additions to the scope of the Act and it is in a diff erent league 
to importing the ECJ ’ s defi nition of  “ use ” . 189 
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 190  [2017] EWHC 2725. Roadpeace is a national charity which promotes road safety and 
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 191  In  R (ClientEarth) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Aff airs [ 2015 ] 
 UKSC 28 , the Supreme Court issued a mandatory order requiring the Secretary of State to 
prepare new air quality plans which should be delivered to the European Commission in 
accordance with a defi ned timetable. 
 192  J.  Davey ,  “ A compulsory diet of chickens and eggs :  Th e EU Motor Insurance Directives 
as a shadow tort regime ” in  P.  Giliker ,  Research Handbook on EU Tort Law ( Edward 
Elgar ,  2017 ) . 
 193  In December 2016, a claim brought by a motor trade dealer who traded from his farm 
in Wales and was injured by a customer test-driving a 4X4 quad bike was settled. Th e 
barrister for the claimant indicated that if the claim had gone to trial and the national 
court not construed UK law to comply with EU law, the claimant would have instigated a 
 Francovich claim:  “ Andrew Ward obtains settlement in a  Vnuk type personal injury claim ” 
3 January 2017. Accessed at  < www.exchangechambers.co.uk > on 9 January 2017. 
 194  See Inception Impact Assessment,  “ Adaptation of the scope of Directive 2009/103/EC on 
motor insurance: Roadmap ” (8 June 2016). 
 195  Department for Transport, Technical consultation on motor insurance:  Consideration of the 
European Court of Justice ruling in the case of  Damijan Vnuk v. Zavarovalnica Triglav d. d , 
 (C-162/13) , published 20 December 2016. Consultation ends on 31 March 2017. 
 Th e issue was addressed directly by the High Court in an action for judicial 
review brought by Roadpeace, a charity which promotes road safety and provides 
support for crash victims. In  Roadpeace v. Secretary of State for Transport, Motor 
Insurer ’ s Bureau , 190 the claimant argued that various provisions of national law 
are inconsistent with EU law. Th e High Court accepted that national law is not 
compliant with the ECJ ’ s ruling in  Vnuk , but also refused to adopt the  Marleasing 
principle on the grounds that it would run counter to the principles set out in 
 Vodafone No. 2 . Th e court was cognisant of its duty to provide eff ective remedies 
in line with Case C-432/05,  Unibet , but considered that the only remedy 
available was to issue a Declaration. It was willing to accept submissions by 
the parties on whether more was required once the judgment has been handed 
down, e.g. a timetable for legislative amendment. 191 
 Th is author argues that the recognition by the judiciary of the potentially 
wide-reaching implications of interpreting national law in compliance with 
 Vnuk for the insurance industry and its business model explains their more 
cautious approach in this fi eld compared to employment policy. For Davey, this 
resistance to  “ Europeanisation ” in the fi eld of motor insurance by some of the 
judiciary, demonstrates a commitment to the model of insurance (and tort) law 
as separate in nature and subject to the market. 192 
 Nevertheless, the inconsistency between EU law and national law exposes 
the UK to a  Francovich damages claim. 193 Given that the full implications of the 
 Vnuk ruling are far-ranging and unforeseen by the Court of Justice, the European 
Commission 194 and the UK Government 195 have launched consultations to 
consider the appropriate (legislative ? ) response. 
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 202  British Gas Trading Ltd v. Lock, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills , EAT, 
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 203  Bear Scotland and Others v. Fulton and Others [ 2015 ]  ICR 221 . Although not bound to follow 
its own decisions, the EAT will fi nd them of persuasive authority and generally will follow 
 5.2. WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE 
 Another area of legal uncertainty has revolved around the correct interpretation 
of the national law purporting to implement the Working Time Directive , 196 
particularly the provisions on annual leave. 197 A preliminary reference was sent 
to the ECJ by an ET to ascertain the correct interpretation of Art. 7(1) with 
regard to holiday pay. Th e case concerned a salesman, whose remuneration 
package included a basic salary plus results-based commission depending 
on the number and type of contracts he persuaded customers to enter into. 
However, his holiday pay consisted only of his basic salary and any commission 
which had been earned at an earlier date but had not been paid at that time. 
Since he was not working he could not earn any commission while he was on 
holiday. He claimed that his rights under EU law had been infringed and that 
the relevant national law 198 should be interpreted in light of the Directive. Th e 
ECJ held in  Lock v. British Gas Trading Ltd 199 that the right to paid annual 
leave is an important principle of EU social law and further, is set out in 
Art. 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 200 Accordingly, Art. 7(1) 
requires that results-based commission paid to an employee which is not 
dependent on the amount of work done by that employee must be taken into 
account in the calculation of pay for annual leave (otherwise employees may be 
deterred from taking leave). On referral back to the ET, it was held that it was 
possible to interpret the relevant national law to comply with EU law by  “ reading 
words ” into the applicable statute. 201 Th is approach was confi rmed on appeal to 
the EAT 202 (following the earlier EAT decision in  Bear Scotland and Others v. 
Fulton and Others ). 203 
Intersentia
Sara Drake
254
them. Th ere are four exceptions to this general principle: (1) where the earlier decision was 
per incuriam, in other words, where a relevant legislative provision or binding decision 
of the courts was not considered; (2) where there are two or more inconsistent decisions 
of the Appeal Tribunal; (3) where there are inconsistent decisions of the Appeal Tribunal 
and another court or tribunal on the same point, at least where they are of co-ordinate 
jurisdiction, for example the High Court; (4) where the earlier decision is manifestly wrong; 
(5) where there are other exceptional circumstances. 
 204  British Gas Trading v. Lock, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [ 2016 ]  EWCA 
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Rasmussen  ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, judgment of 19 April 2016 (Grand Chamber). Th is 
judgment and the response of the Danish courts is discussed elsewhere in this volume. 
 206  Sir Colin Rimer refers to Arden LJ at para. 113. 
 207  Ibid., paras. 109 – 12. 
 208  Ibid., paras. 114 – 16. 
 On appeal before the Court of Appeal, 204 the leading judge, Sir Colin Rimer 
was also prepared to interpret national law to comply with EU law. He dismissed 
the argument that such an interpretation would be  contra legem as held in 
case-law pre-dating the jurisprudence of the ECJ on Art. 7. He added that in 
light of the recent judgment in Case C-441/14,  Dansk Industri , 205 the existence 
of confl icting domestic case-law does not prevent a conform interpretation 
being adopted by a national court. In his view, the case fell within a set of 
circumstances referred to by Arden LJ in  IDT Card Services Ltd 206 whereby the 
correct interpretation of the law could not have been envisaged by Parliament 
when adopting the domestic implementing legislation, but that there was no 
confl ict with the  “ grain or thrust ” of the national legislation. 207 In an interesting 
development, the judge confi ned  Lock to its facts. He also held that a narrower 
interpretation of national law should be adopted which referred to results-based 
commission only. Th e conforming interpretation originally adopted by the ET 
had referred to all forms of commission. Deep concerns about the implications 
of such a broad interpretation were raised during the proceedings as this 
could include,  inter alia , bankers ’ bonuses! 208 Permission to appeal against 
the Court of Appeal ruling to the Supreme Court was refused, paving the way 
for payment of compensation for Mr Lock and thousands of employees in a 
similar position. 
 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Th is contribution explores the application and the eff ectiveness of the principle 
of consistent interpretation by the UK courts since its inception by the ECJ in 
 Von Colson in 1984. Th ree phases are identifi ed in the application of this 
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EU method of statutory interpretation by the UK courts. Th ey broadly 
refl ect a shift  from a traditionalist view of parliamentary sovereignty, where 
Parliament is deemed to be the supreme law-maker, to the New View, where it 
is accepted that parliamentary sovereignty has to be reconciled with the UK ’ s 
international law obligations stemming from its membership of the European 
Union and as a signatory to the European Convention of Human Rights . Th e 
fi rst phase immediately follows the establishment of the duty in  Von Colson and 
demonstrates a cautious approach: where national legislation had been enacted 
to give eff ect to EU law, the national courts were prepared to apply the principle 
of consistent interpretation to read words into a statute where a literal reading 
was not ambiguous, but would not be suffi  cient to comply with EU law; yet 
where national legislation pre-dated an EU directive, the UK courts refused to 
interpret it in light of a later EU directive. Th is initial reluctance and arguably 
deference to parliamentary sovereignty and its legislative intentions changed 
following the  Marleasing ruling in 1990 (and the ruling of the then House of 
Lords in  Factortame ), where the ECJ was unequivocal in stating that the duty of 
consistent interpretation imposed on national courts required them to consider 
all national law, even if it pre-dated the confl icting EU law. At this point, the UK 
courts entered into a second phase in which they broadly accepted the full nature 
of the duty imposed on them by EU law. Indeed, from this point onwards, the 
principle of consistent interpretation was more commonly referred to by legal 
counsel and the judiciary as the  “ Marleasing principle ” . Th is phase continued 
until the House of Lords delivered its decision in  Ghaidan . Th is was a judgment 
on the interpretation of a statute in light of the HRA and it explored in depth 
the duty of interpretation incumbent on national courts to interpret national law 
in compliance with the ECHR. It was later claimed by the Court of Appeal that 
it was at this point that the UK judiciary  “ assimilated ” their duty under s. 3 of 
the HRA with their duty under EU law under the  Marleasing principle (or vice 
versa). Th ere is now no discernible diff erence in the application of the principle 
of consistent interpretation when determining its scope, namely whether a 
consistent interpretation is  “ possible ” . Th e UK courts are confi dent in complying 
with the interpretative obligation derived from EU law and are clear as to the 
boundaries between interpretation and amendment of the law. Th e courts have 
consistently refused to  “ go against the grain ” of national legislation enacted 
by Parliament and venture into the fi eld of policy-making. Th e contribution 
draws attention to the areas of motor insurance law and annual leave where 
the use of the principle of consistent interpretation has been more cautious 
and contested before the UK courts. Th is uncertainty in the law has arguably 
led to unnecessary and costly litigation for individuals seeking to assert their 
EU rights where national implementing legislation is deemed out of line with 
EU law, sometimes as a result of later ECJ rulings. Th ere remains a great deal of 
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legal uncertainty surrounding the UK ’ s departure from the EU. Nevertheless, on 
the basis of this contribution, it can predicted that the UK judiciary will interpret 
in accordance with Parliament ’ s intentions. For this reason, it is essential that 
the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (and any other Acts of Parliament related to 
Brexit) clearly stipulate the obligations of the judiciary to interpret national law 
to comply with EU law as it evolves post-Brexit either through legislation or 
judgments of the ECJ. 
